Interpretive Analyses

What Did “Consideration” Originally Mean?

Students are taught that a contract needs offer, acceptance and consideration, and that consideration means a bargained-for exchange. Many readers outside the law sense that the word must once have meant something more. It did — though not quite what popular theories suggest.

A word about reasons

In ordinary English, "consideration" means a reason weighed in the mind. In early common law pleading, the phrase "in consideration that" introduced the reason a promise had been made. It sat alongside older ideas: the action of debt required a quid pro quo, something actually received, and Roman and canon law spoke of causa, the ground that made a promise enforceable.

The decisive growth came through the action of assumpsit, which allowed suits on informal promises. Slade's Case (1602) confirmed that a promise to pay could be enforced in assumpsit where a debt existed. Over the following century courts asked what made such promises actionable, and "consideration" became the answer: a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee.

A moment when it might have become something else

In Pillans v Van Mierop (1765), Lord Mansfield suggested that consideration was merely evidence that a promise was seriously meant, and that among merchants a written promise needed none. Thirteen years later, in Rann v Hughes (1778), the House of Lords rejected that view: a promise not under seal was unenforceable without consideration, written or not. That fork in the road is one of the genuinely open "what ifs" of legal history.

From benefit and detriment to bargain

Currie v Misa (1875) gave the classic English formulation: consideration "may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other." In America, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. recast it in The Common Law (1881) as reciprocal inducement — the promise and the consideration each inducing the other. That bargain theory is the modern rule (Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71).

The sealed instrument

Before and alongside all of this stood the seal. A promise under seal — a deed — was enforced because of its form, not its consideration; courts said the seal "imported" consideration. Many American states have since abolished or weakened the seal, which is part of why recited nominal sums survive in documents: they are a faint echo of a world in which form itself carried binding force.

Where modern claims enter

Some modern theories treat consideration as a hidden term that, if absent or unpaid in "real" money, voids mortgages, taxes or court judgments. The history points elsewhere. Consideration was always a test for enforcing private promises, not a condition on obligations imposed by law, and its content has steadily become more formal, not more substantive. Yet the older meaning — a reason that justifies holding someone to their word — remains a fair question to put to any obligation. What is the reason this binds me? The doctrine was built to answer exactly that.

Sources & references

Slade's Case (1602) 4 Co Rep 92b; Pillans v Van Mierop (1765) 3 Burr 1663; Rann v Hughes (1778) 7 TR 350n; Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Ex 153; O. W. Holmes Jr., The Common Law (1881), Lecture VII; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71; A. W. B. Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract (1975).

Share This Article

Published for educational and historical research purposes. This entry is not legal advice.