Case Identification
Case name: Miranda v. Arizona
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: Federal
Year: 1966
Citation: 384 U.S. 436
Claim Presented
The petitioner challenged the admissibility of statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted without notification of constitutional rights. The claim asserted that statements elicited by law enforcement officers during incommunicado interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere, without full warning of constitutional rights, violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The petitioner contended that the prosecution’s use of such statements at trial constituted a deprivation of due process of law.
Authority Cited
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as applied to state criminal proceedings.
Court’s Analysis
The Court defined custodial interrogation as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant way. The Court examined the relationship between police interrogation practices in a custodial setting and the Fifth Amendment privilege, determining that the circumstances of in-custody interrogation contain inherently compelling pressures that work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.
The Court identified specific procedural safeguards necessary to protect the privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The Court stated that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”
The Court determined that these warnings are required prior to custodial interrogation to ensure that statements obtained are truly the product of free choice. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. The Court held that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.
The Court concluded that without proper safeguards, the process of in-custody interrogation contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist. The Court held that statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted without adherence to these procedural safeguards are inadmissible.
Disposition
The Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona. The Court held that the statements obtained from the petitioner during custodial interrogation without the required warnings were inadmissible in the criminal proceeding against him.
Procedural Outcome
The case was remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with the Court’s opinion. Statements obtained from the defendant during custodial interrogation without proper warnings regarding the right to remain silent, the potential use of statements as evidence, the right to counsel, and the availability of appointed counsel for indigent defendants were to be excluded from evidence.
Archival Note
This entry documents the judicial record in Miranda v. Arizona as preserved in the official reports. The decision addressed constitutional requirements governing custodial interrogation and clarified procedural safeguards necessary to protect the privilege against self-incrimination.