This article provides a doctrinal analysis of the relationship between subject-matter jurisdiction and the doctrine of res judicata, focusing on how courts distinguish fundamental judicial authority from procedural or remedial doctrines. Gavit explains that subject-matter jurisdiction arises exclusively from constitutional and statutory grants of power and cannot be created, waived, or conferred by the actions or acquiescence of the parties.
The work examines how a judgment entered without subject-matter jurisdiction is void and therefore lacks preclusive effect, whereas judgments entered with lawful jurisdiction — even if flawed in reasoning or procedure — have binding force under res judicata. Gavit situates this distinction within early twentieth-century judicial practice, demonstrating that jurisdictional authority is a structural prerequisite to any valid judicial act.
By clarifying the foundational status of subject-matter jurisdiction and its interaction with doctrines of finality, the article sheds light on why courts treat jurisdictional defects as distinct from ordinary errors. It reflects the institutional understanding of judicial power and procedural limits as articulated in American jurisprudence prior to modern procedural reform.
Citation
Gavit, B. C. (1932). Jurisdiction of the subject matter and res judicata. University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register, 80, 965–988.
University of Pennsylvania Law Review (PDF)